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A hedonic price function describes the equilibrium relationship between
characteristics of a product and its price. They are used to predict prices
of new goods, to adjust for quality change in price indexes, and to mea-
sure consumer and producer valuations of di⁄erentiated products. They
emerge as market outcomes from both competitive and non-competitive
markets. The functional form is determined by the distribution of buy-
ers and their preferences, the distribution of sellers and their costs, and
the structure of competition in the market.Hedonic price function
A hedonic price function describes the equilibrium relationship be-
tween the economically relevant characteristics of a product or service
(or bundle of products) and its price. For example, in a simple labour
economics model, the hedonic wage function might describe how the
wages of a worker depend on education, experience, and skill. In a sim-
ple housing economics model, the hedonic house price might describe
how the price of a house depends on geographic location, size, and qual-
ity. In each case, the hedonic price function describes equilibrium (not
necessarily competitive) valuations of the economically relevant charac-
teristics of the product.
In empirical applications, statistical estimates of hedonic price func-
tions have primarily been used to calculate quality adjusted price in-
dexes for goods and to measure consumer valuations or producer costs
of product characteristics. They have been used to study markets for
agricultural products, automobiles, labor, houses, computers, and myr-
iad other di⁄erentiated commodities. They have been used to measure
quality change in private goods markets and to measure consumer valu-
ations of changes in public goods such as clean air, schools or transport
infrastructure. In all these applications, hedonic methods are crucial
because the goods in question are not homogenous and their value to
1buyers and sellers varies systematically with characteristics.
Key questions to be answered when developing a hedonic model to
analyze a product market are what are the economically relevant char-
acteristics of the product and what is the market environment that gen-
erates the hedonic equilibrium price. Given answers to these questions,
a key theoretical goal of hedonic analysis is to determine the theoreti-
cal relationship between these market equilibrium prices and underlying
structural features of the economy such as producer costs and consumer
preferences. Two key empirical goals of hedonic analysis are to under-
stand when statistical estimates of hedonic relationships provide good
out-of-sample predictions of prices and to understand what structural
information these statistical relationships provide about costs and pref-
erences.
1 General hedonic demand
Hedonic models make various assumptions about whether the space of
feasible characteristics is discrete or is a continuum, and whether the
characteristics embodied in di⁄erent products can be bundled or unbun-
dled. This section discusses a general model of hedonic demand that
encompasses these special cases. The supply side of the market and
various notions of equilibrium are discussed in section 2.
Each consumer who participates in the hedonic market derives utility
2from a vector of characteristics z 2 Zm ￿ Rnz: The bundle z is obtained
either by buying a single product that embodies z or by buying a set
of products that together produce z: In either case the hedonic cost
or price is p(z): The set Zm is the feasible set given current market
conditions. The set Zm could be a ￿nite set or it could be a continuum.
Each consumer also has the option not to participate in the hedonic
market in which case they obtain reservation utility u0: Assume that
characteristics are de￿ned so that utility is increasing in each element of
z: Also, assume that utility is decreasing in p(z):
Every consumer is represented by a type x 2 X ￿ Rnx: The space X
is the space of all consumer types. The vector x is a vector of consumer
characteristics (such as income, education or preference parameters) that
a⁄ects utility. Consumer heterogeneity is an important feature of hedo-
nic models.
Given hedonic price p(z); consumer x chooses z 2 Zm to maximize




The solution z = d(x) is the hedonic demand function (or correspon-
dence) for consumer x:
Several features of the model are important. First, z is a complete
3list of the product characteristics that both a⁄ect consumer utility and
are known to the consumer at time of purchase. In the housing market
example, z could measure geographic location, age of the dwelling, lot
size, number of rooms, size of the yard, etc. Second, there may be
additional characteristics of the good that a⁄ect ex post utility but that
are not known to the consumer at time of purchase. In such cases,
the utility function should be interpreted as the expected utility from
purchasing a good with known characteristics z: Third, buyer utility
depends on x and on z: Two consumers, x1 and x2; with x1 6= x2; will
generally choose di⁄erent bundles (z1;p(z1)) and (z2;p(z2)) and will
obtain di⁄erent levels of utility.
1.1 Continuous choice version
To specialize to the case where Zm is a compact convex subset of Rn;
both u and p are di⁄erentiable and the consumer maximization problem
has an interior solution, the ￿rst order condition describing the con-





















The marginal price at z equals the marginal rate of substitution of the
consumer x who chooses z: In the quasi-linear utility case u(x;z;p(z)) =







These results are the basis for the intuition that the slope of the he-
donic price function measures consumers￿marginal willingness to pay.
Figure 1 illustrates. Consumers x1 and x2 optimally choose bundles z1
and z2 respectively. At z1; the marginal price equals the marginal will-
ingness to pay of consumer x1: However, it is less than the marginal
willingness to pay of consumer x2: At z2; the marginal price equals the
marginal willingness to pay of x2 but is greater than the marginal will-
ingness to pay of x1:
The hedonic price function reveals precise information about con-
sumers x1 and x2 at points z1 and z2 respectively. At all other person-
location pairs, it reveals only bounds on willingness to pay. It also reveals
very little about how consumers x1 and x2 will react to large changes in
5the shape of the price function. More precise information requires the
estimation of consumer preferences.
1.2 Discrete choice version
If the marginal conditions in (3) and (4) are replaced by inequalities, the
qualitative interpretations above apply equally to economies in which Zm
is ￿nite. Suppose there are J elements in Zm: Let zj be the j￿ th element
in Zm and let pj = p(zj) for j = 1;:::;J: In the quasi-linear case, if
consumer x chooses zj, then
u(x;zj) ￿ pj ￿ u(x;zk) ￿ pk
for all k 2 f1;:::;Jg:
Consider the set of consumers who choose zj and for whom
u(x;zj) ￿ pj = u(x;zk) ￿ pk (5)
for some k 6= j: These consumers are indi⁄erent between bundle zj at
price pj and bundle zk at price pk: The di⁄erence in prices between
zj and zk exactly compensates for the di⁄erence in utilities. For these
6indi⁄erent consumers, willingness to pay for zj over zk is
pj ￿ pk = u(x;zj) ￿ u(x;zk):
This is the discrete analog of the marginal willingness to pay.
Equation (5) only holds for those who are indi⁄erent between j and
k: For those who are not indi⁄erent, the willingness to pay for zj over
zk is strictly larger than the price. That is
u(x;zj) ￿ u(x;zk) > pj ￿ pk:
When the set of available alternatives Zm is ￿nite, the hedonic price
function provides a precise measure of willingness to pay for consumers
who are indi⁄erent between options and provides bounds on willingness
to pay for consumers who strictly prefer one option to others.
1.3 Single product demand version
In single product demand models, the vector z measures the character-
istics of the unique product type that is chosen. These models assume
that households cannot buy two separate products with characteristics
z1 and z2 and combine their characteristics to obtain some other bundle
z3 (Rosen, 1974). These models do allow consumers to choose both a




fe u(x ￿ qp(z);z;q)g
where q is the quantity of product type z and x is income. This is the
primary model used to study location choices and demand for land in
urban economic models. See Fujita (1991).
1.4 Home production version
Home production models assume that consumers purchase a vector of
goods in quantities q 2 Rn
+ at market prices ￿ 2 Rn
+ and produce the
bundle z from the goods purchased. See Gorman (1980), Lancaster
(1966), and Muellbauer (1974). In home production hedonic models,
consumers have a technology f : Z ￿ Rn ￿! Rm describing the pro-
duction possibility frontier. Given purchases of q units of market goods,
any bundle z that satis￿es the restriction f (z;q) = 0 is feasible.




f￿ ￿ q subject to f (z;q) = 0g: (6)
Thus, the hedonic price p(z) is the minimum cost of obtaining bundle
z given market prices ￿ and technology f: Given p(z); consumers max-
8imize the utility given in (1): The single product demand model is a
special case of the home production model.
In the Gorman/Lancaster version of the model, the technology is
linear and f (z;q) = z ￿ Aq where A is a nz ￿ nq matrix. Each market
good contains a ￿xed quantity of characteristics. The total amount
available for consumption is the sum of characteristics across all goods
purchased.
1.5 Hedonic cost of living index
In each of these models, one can calculate various hedonic cost of living
indexes. See Pollak (1989) for details of many alternatives. This section
discusses one alternative.
Consider a consumer who purchases a vector of quantities of homoge-
nous goods q with linear prices ￿ and a single di⁄erentiated product with
characteristics z and hedonic price p(z): When prices are (￿;p); the cost
of obtaining utility level u0 is
c(￿;p;u0) = min
fq;zg
f￿ ￿ q + p(z) subject to u(q;z) ￿ u0g: (7)
If prices change from (￿0;p0) to (￿1;p1); then the constant utility hedo-




This cost index hold utility constant and allows consumers to alter con-
sumption of q and z in response to changing prices. When consumer
preferences are unknown, this theoretical index cannot be calculated.
With data on prices and quantities, empirical alternatives include the
Laspeyres index and the Paasch index.
Let (q0;z0) solve (7) when prices are (￿0;p0) in period zero. Let
prices in period one be (￿1;p1): Then a hedonic Laspeyres index is
L(q1;p1;q0;p0;x0;z0) =
￿1 ￿ q0 + p1 (z0)





This index holds the consumption bundle (q0;z0) constant at initial lev-
els. Like the standard Laspeyres index, it is an overestimate of the cost of
living index because it ignores a consumer￿ s ability to alter consumption
in response to changing prices. If some components of z are exogenous
(e.g. public goods like air quality or public safety), alternative indexes
can be de￿ned by including the time varying exogenous elements of z as
arguments in the cost function.
One major problem with the index is that the set of available prod-
10ucts often changes rapidly over time. If product z0 is not traded in
period one, then p1 (z0) will not be observed. Pakes (2003) shows that
an estimate of p1 (z0) based on observed prices is an upper bound under
certain circumstances. A better option is to calculate the virtual price
pV
1 (z0) that makes the household indi⁄erent between purchasing z0 at
price pV
1 (z0)and purchasing z1 (the product actually chosen in period 1)
at price p1 (z1): The virtual price satis￿es
p
V
1 (z0) = p1 (z1) ￿ (u(x;z1) ￿ u(x;z0)):
Data on prices and quantities can be used to bound the virtual price.
Precise results require estimation of consumer preferences.
Another major problem is that statistical authorities, as discussed
in section 3, do not observe the elements of z that enter consumer pref-
erences. A third major problem is that time constraints and cost con-
straints place severe limitations on data collection and analysis for use
in practical price index calculations. Triplett (2004) provides a compre-
hensive overview of these issues.
2 Market equilibrium
Hedonic prices emerge as equilibrium outcomes from a market environ-
ment. They might emerge from a purely competitive environment in
11which neither buyers nor sellers have power to in￿ uence prices or they
might emerge from an imperfectly competitive environment in which
either buyers or sellers have market power. They may be observed in
arms-length transactions or unobserved as in black market wage con-
tracts or implicit marriage contracts.
In general, the hedonic price function in a market is a nonlinear
function of the characteristics z: Its functional form is determined by
the distribution of buyers and their preferences, the distribution of sellers
and their costs, and by the type of equilibrium in the market. Special
cases exist where more can be said. If bundles of characteristics can be
unbundled, arbitrage leads to a linear hedonic price (Rosen, 1974). In
the Gorman/Lancaster model, the hedonic price function is piece-wise
linear (See Pollak (1983) or Heckman and Scheinkman (1987)). In the
Tinbergen (1956) model, the hedonic price is quadratic. When both
buyer utility and seller costs depend on z only through an index q (z);
the hedonic price function satis￿es p(z) = e p(q (z)):
2.1 Competitive hedonic equilibrium
Consider a one dimensional Tinbergen/Rosen model in which consumers
of type x 2 R+ choose z 2 R+: Assume that consumer utility is
u(x;z) = xe u(z) where x
@e u(z)




@z > 0: Assume
that the distribution of consumer types is described by the distribution
12function Fx (x) with density function fx (x) and support R+:
Treat the supply side symmetrically. Assume that ￿rms of type y 2
















@z < 0: The distribution
function describing the distribution of ￿rms is Fy (y) with density fy (y)
and support R+:
Given a di⁄erentiable price, consumers solve
max
fzg
fxe u(z) ￿ p(z)g:









This equation implicitly de￿nes the buyer demand function z = d(x)









the consumer second order condition implies that
@ e d(z)
@z > 0: As a re-














By the same reasoning, the ￿rms￿￿rst order conditions de￿ne the in-








which also is monotonic.









13An equilibrium hedonic price function is one that equates the distrib-
utions of supply and demand. Formally, a function p(z) is an equilibrium


















for almost all z 2 Zm and if p(zmin) ensures that all buyers and sellers
obtain at least their reservation utilities.





@y@z < 0; the equilibrium involves positive assortative matching
between buyers and sellers. Second, the equilibrium price depends on u;
the preferences of buyers, c; the costs of sellers, and on Fx and Fy; the
distributions of both types of agents. Third, the price function is the
envelope of seller cost and buyer utility.
In more general cases and in cases of higher dimension, the di⁄erential
equation (8) often does not have nice numerical properties. However, one
can solve the equilibrium problem by solving the associated social welfare
maximization problem which is an optimal transportation problem (an
in￿nite dimensional linear programming problem with special structure).
Recent results in this area include Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame (1999) and
Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim (2006).
142.2 Oligopoly hedonic equilibrium
When there is imperfect competition in hedonic markets, ￿rms set prices
to maximize pro￿ts. Assume individual demand is derived from the dis-
crete choice model in section 1.2. Let p = (p1;:::;pJ) and z = (z1;:::;zJ):
Given p and z; let Dj (p;z;x) 2 [0;1] be the demand of consumer x for
product j: Let fx (x) be the density of consumer types with support X:





Given the strategies of all ￿rms k 6= j; ￿rm j solves
max
fzj;pjg
fpjqj (p;z) ￿ c(j;qj;zj)g






















A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies (zj;pj) for each
￿rm j = 1;:::;J such that each ￿rm maximize pro￿ts given the strategies
of its competitors. In a Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium hedonic prices
15p and characteristics z are determined by the distribution of buyers and
their preferences, the costs of the competitors and by the competitive
structure of the market. Buyers preferences u and the distribution fx
determine the structure of demand. This demand structure combined
with the costs of competitors and the number of competitors determine
the ￿erceness of competition. See for example Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995).
3 Estimating hedonic prices
3.1 Ideal case: z is perfectly observed
The theory of hedonic prices places no restrictions on the hedonic price
functional form. The lack of theoretical predictions has led to contro-
versy about functional form in empirical hedonic price work. Di⁄erent
researchers have used linear models, log linear models, Box-Cox models,
and ￿xed e⁄ect models. To estimate hedonic quality adjustments for use
in price indexes, many statistical authorities adopt the even more restric-
tive ￿time-dummy" model in which the hedonic price function takes the
form
pt = ￿0 + ￿1z1t + ￿2z2t + ￿3 ￿ Dt + "t (11)
where Dt is a vector of time dummies. See Triplett (2004) for a detailed
discussion. This version restricts the hedonic price function to be linear
16in characteristics and to have coe¢ cients that are constant over time.
The time-dummy model is rarely theoretically justi￿ed and the constant
coe¢ cient restriction is usually rejected in empirical tests. Nevertheless,
Triplett (2004) argues that in many cases of interest to statistical au-
thorities, the restriction works as an approximation and does not make
much empirical di⁄erence for estimates of hedonic price indexes.
There is no theoretical justi￿cation for restrictive parametric empir-
ical models of hedonic prices unless prior knowledge of the market and
the products traded exists to support the restrictions. When datasets
are large and the dimension of z is small, there is little empirical jus-
ti￿cation for parametric models either. In such cases, hedonic price
functions should be estimated nonparametrically unless prior knowledge
su¢ cient to restrict the model exists. Such nonparametric regressions
can be easily estimated on desktop computers.
When sample size is small or the dimension of z is large, however,
then unrestricted nonparametric methods are often impractical. In these
cases, prior information should ￿rst be used to impose structure on the
hedonic relationship. In some cases, it is then feasible to use semi-
parametric methods to estimate the hedonic relationship without im-
posing further structure. In many (if not most) cases, however, there is
no choice but to impose further structure that is supported neither by
17data nor by theory. If the primary use of the method is to predict prices
out-of-sample, then goodness of ￿t and stability with respect to chang-
ing market conditions can be useful criteria to choose functional form.
If the primary use, is to estimate marginal willingness to pay in some
dimension, then semiparametric methods that allow for ￿ exibility in the
dimension of interest might be of most use. Tests for robustness should
be implemented and interpretations of results should consider potential
mis-speci￿cation biases.
3.2 Practical case: z is imperfectly observed.
Empirical estimates of hedonic price functions may be biased due to
omitted variables or mis-measured variables. Assume the goal is to esti-
mate the hedonic price p(z) and that the methods used will rely on esti-
mation of conditional expectations. Discussion of estimation of ln(p(z))
or methods based on other statistics such as the median would proceed
along similar lines.
Let z = (z1;z2) be the set of all hedonic characteristics and let e z =
(e z1;e z2) be the set of variables that the econometrician observes. Assume
that z1 is observed without error so that e z1 = z1: Assume that e z2 is
a vector of proxy variables (or instrumental variables) and that z2 =
g (e z2;"2) where "2 is a vector of unobservables. Let p(z1;z2) be the
18theoretical hedonic price function. Observed prices e p satisfy
e p = p(e z1;g (e z2;"2)) + ￿ (12)
where ￿ is measurement error, E (￿) = 0, and ￿ is assumed indepen-
dent of (e z1;e z2;"2): The unobserved characteristic case, is the case where
g (e z2;"2) = "2 and f"2 ("2 je z1;e z2) = f"2 ("2 je z1): Then "2 is the unobserved
characteristic of the product.
Under these assumptions, the expectation of e p conditional on (e z1;e z2)
is
E (e pje z1;e z2)=
Z
p(e z1;g (e z2;"2))f"2 ("2 je z1;e z2)d"2 (13)
=h(e z1;e z2)
where f"2 ("2 je z1;e z2) is the density of "2 conditional on (e z1;e z2): This is
the best predictor (in the integrated squared error sense) of e p given data
on (e z1;e z2): However, in general h(e z1;e z2) 6= p(e z1;e z2) and little can be
said about the relationship between the two without more information.
Researchers have employed instrumental variables techniques or prior
information that places structure on g; on p; or on f"2 to cope with this
problem. See Chay and Greenstone (2005) and Bajari and Benkhard
(2005) for examples.
194 Estimating hedonic preferences
In most cases, the full set of consumer characteristics that a⁄ect choices
is not observed. The econometrician only observes a subset of consumer
characteristics such as education, income, age, and household structure.
For example, suppose the consumer has two characteristics (x;") and x







This equation de￿nes the hedonic demand function z = d(x;"):
When data on (x;z;p) are available, u cannot be estimated directly
using (14) because z is an endogenous variable. As in Figure 1 where
households with di⁄erent values of x choose di⁄erent value of z; house-
holds with di⁄erent values of " will choose di⁄erent values of z:
Additional restrictions can help identify u: Ekeland, Heckman, and
Nesheim (2004) show that the utility function can be identi￿ed nonpara-
metrically if @u
@z is additively separable. That is if,
@u(x;";z)
@z
= u0 (x) + u1 (z) + "
where u0 and u1 are arbitrary nonparametric functions.
More generally, Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2005) prove that
20the demand function d(x;") can be estimated using data on (z;x) alone
if " is statistically independent of x: They further show that the function
u is not identi￿ed with data from a single market unless prior information
is used to restrict u: For example, if marginal utility is weakly separable
so that
@u(x;";z)
@z = v (q (z;x);") where q is a known function, then the
function v can be estimated.
Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2005) also show how to use multi-
market data to estimate the unrestricted equation (14): Because cross
market variation in prices is tied to cross market variation in the dis-
tributions of buyers and sellers, it is functionally independent of within
market variation in z and x: As a result, this cross market variation in
prices can then be used to identify and estimate the function u:
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24Figure 1: Tangency of price and utility
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